NHFPC, 24
April 2013 -- Good morning and thank you for your
attendance today.
As you know, at
the invitation of the China National Health and Family Planning Commission
(NHFPC), a joint team of domestic and international experts convened by the
World Health Organization were asked to assess the H7N9 situation in China and
provide recommendations on the prevention and control of the disease.
The team, which
is jointly led by NHFPC and WHO, is comprised of international and Chinese
influenza experts in epidemiology, virology, clinical management, and other
areas related to influenza.
During 19-23
April, we visited laboratories, hospitals, clinics, markets, and affected areas
in Shanghai and had discussion with staff and experts from both Beijing and
Shanghai.? We had open and direct exchanges and discussions with our
counterparts in Beijing and Shanghai.? We would like to share some of our
findings today.
First of all,
we are impressed with the response by the Government of China.? China has
responded to this serious outbreak caused by a new influenza virus with strong
leadership and a high level of commitment, and sound and effective strategies
such as health education, communication and closure of live poultry
market.?
Health
authorities were well prepared and acted quickly, effectively and
professionally.? Information including genetic sequence data and virus
were shared in a timely way within China and with the international community
through WHO under the International Health Regulations.
The joint team
visited poultry market and the neighbourhood in Shanghai where some infections
were reported.? According to available evidence, birds infected by the
virus, especially poultry, and the environment contaminated by the virus are
the most likely sources of infection. The risk of infection appears most
concentrated in live poultry markets.
Almost all
cases have been sporadic cases, but a few family clusters have been identified.
However, we are not sure if the clusters were caused by common exposure to a
source of virus or due to limited person to person transmission.? Evidence
so far is not sufficient to conclude there is person to person transmission.
Moreover, no sustained person to person transmission has been found.
We want to note
that if limited person to person transmission is demonstrated in the future, it
will not be surprising. Enhancing surveillance is the way to early detect such
occurrence.
The situation
remains complex and difficult and is evolving. WHO will continue to work
closely with China in combating this new threat.
For next steps
to prevent and control H7N9, the joint mission team would like to make
following recommendations.
First, it is
important to undertake intense and focused investigations to determine the
source(s) of human H7N9 infections with a view to taking urgent action to
prevent continuing virus spread and its potentially severe consequences for
human and animal health.
Second, it is
critical to maintain a high level of alert, preparedness and response for the
H7N9 virus even though human cases might drop in the summer, as occurs with
many other avian influenza viruses, because of the seriousness of the risk
posed by this virus and because much basic information remains unknown.
Third, it is
critical to continue to conduct and strengthen both epidemiological and
laboratory-based surveillance in human and animals in all Provinces of China to
identify changes that might indicate the virus is spreading geographically and
gaining the ability to infect people more easily.
Fourth, it is
important to ensure that there is frequent two-way sharing of information,
close and timely communications and, when appropriate, coordinated or joint
investigations and research between ministries of health, agriculture and
forestry because this threat requires the combined efforts of these
sectors.???
Fourth, it is
important to continue high level scientific collaborations, communications and
sharing of sequence data and viruses with WHO and international partners
because the threat of H7N9 is also an international shared risk and concern.
Fifth, it is
important to encourage and foster the scientific and epidemiological studies
and research needed to close major gaps in critical knowledge and understanding
Last but not
the least, it is important to continue preparedness planning and other IHR core
capacity strengthening work because such investments make major differences in
being ready to address health security risks and emergencies, including
H7N9.?
Thank you.
?
From NHFPC: http://www.moh.gov.cn/wsb/pxwfb/201304/b3d27fec99b7423687f1e279aa7c619f.shtml
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Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention(China CDC)
155 Changbai Road Changping District | Beijing | 102206 | People's Republic of China
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